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Over the last several years, municipal broadband service provided via fiber to
the home (FTTH) has attracted significant attention from industry analysts,
policy advocates, and the media.
News stories have pointed to FTTH projects in places
like Chattanooga, TN, as success models that other
cities should follow. In February 2015, the Federal
Communications Commission attempted to open the
door to more widespread use of municipal fiber by
preempting state laws blocking cities from investing
in broadband, only to see its efforts overturned by the
courts the following year. Other countries have shown
similar interest in constructing public fiber networks.
In Europe, press reports calling for Gigabit broadband
have led countries such as Germany and Great Britain
to consider devoting resources from their Universal
Service Funds to FTTH rollouts. The Australian government has invested US$36 billion to deploy fiber
to its citizens through its National Broadband Network (NBN).
At the same time, the fate of some fiber projects
has provided reason for caution. Several promising U.S. projects bled substantial amounts of red ink
before they were sold to private companies for a fraction of their costs.1 Other municipalities, including
Burlington, VT, and Monticello, MN, have defaulted
on the debt they incurred to fund their fiber networks
and now face credit downgrades. Google Fiber has

SUMMARY
• In the interest of bringing high-speed broadband access to
communities underserved by current Internet service providers,
many U.S. cities have initiated municipal broadband projects.
Such efforts have received favorable attention in the media,
as well as support from many state and federal lawmakers
and regulators eager to help close the digital divide.
• But is municipal broadband economically viable? There has
been a dearth of concrete data for answering that question. This
brief presents a first look at a new, comprehensive empirical
analysis of 20 U.S. municipal fiber builds for which financial
data is available.
• The findings provide considerable reason for caution. More
than half of the projects in this study are cash-flow negative,
and based on their performance from 2010-2014, 90 percent
are unable to generate sufficient cash to recover their project
costs within the 30-40 year life expectancy of a municipal
fiber build.
• City leaders considering such projects, as well as state and
federal officials interested in supporting them, need to understand the documented costs and risks before encouraging new
municipal fiber programs to form.
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halted further rollouts in new cities. And looking abroad, in 2013,
prohibitive costs forced Australia
to abandon further expansion of its
ambitious FTTH initiative in favor
of an approach providing new service
through a mix of legacy technologies.
The debate between advocates
and critics of municipal fiber has been
hampered by the dearth of hard data
on existing projects. This Issue Brief
highlights the key takeaways from
a comprehensive study of municipal
fiber operations in the U.S. The core
of the analysis is based on an empirical assessment of every U.S. municipal
fiber build, applying the standard
tools of financial analysis to data
drawn from the official bond documents issued when the projects were
launched and from the audited financial statements filed by these projects
during a five-year period (2010-2014).
In so doing, this research represents
the first systematic effort to place
the debate over municipal fiber on a
sound empirical foundation.

THE CURRENT FTTH
LANDSCAPE
The Executive Office of the President’s January 2015 report on Community-Based Broadband Solutions as
well as trade and scholarly publications indicate that 88 local govern-

appear to be broadly representative of
the overall U.S. population, but the
median household income of $41,527
is below the 2014 national median of
$53,657. The data suggest that high
median household income is no guarantee of a network’s solvency, as the
only municipality in this study with
a median household income above
the national median (Monticello) has
already defaulted on its FTTH debt
obligations. These data permit us to
assess the likelihood that these projects will be able to cover their costs
through the standard tool used by the
investment community to evaluate
projects’ financial viability: Discounted
Cash Flows (DCFs).

ments have deployed FTTH.2 Of
these projects, only 20 reported the
results of their broadband operations
separately in their audited financial
statements, with the others opting to
combine their broadband and electric
power operations into a single set of
financial statements.3
The audited financial statements
provide data about the annual cash
flows for all 20 of the projects that
reported the financial performance of
their broadband operations separately.
A review of the bond instruments filed
with the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) provides the
project cost and cost of capital for 13
of the 20 projects. For the remaining
seven projects, we estimated project
cost and cost of capital by using the
median values of the 13 projects for
which we have data, which yielded a
project cost per household of $2,215
(normalized for 2010 dollars) and a
cost of capital of 5.11%. The project
cost data compare unfavorably to the
$750 estimated cost per household
of Verizon’s FiOS project and are
much closer to the roughly $3,000
per household figure that eventually
led Australia to walk away from its
FTTH builds. Note that the project
cost data do not include any federal or
state subsidies that municipalities may
have received.
The cities with municipal fiber

The financial community universally
regards cash flow as more important
than profitability, since it is cash flow
(and not income) that determines
whether an organization remains solvent. Discounting the cash flows takes
into account the cost of financing as
well as the time value of money.
DCF analysis indicates that 11 of
the 20 municipal projects were cash
flow negative from 2010 to 2014,
many of them substantially so. (See
Table 1 for full results.) Unless these

another was initiated by a county (Churchill County, NV).
The fact that less than a quarter of U.S. municipal fiber
builds reported their broadband operations separately
does raise the possibility of sample bias. One possible
motivation for combining operations into a single set of
financial statements is to conceal a broadband operation’s
poor performance. To the extent this is true, the results of

our analysis are biased in favor of making municipal fiber
appear more successful than would be the case had all
of these projects reported their data separately. If so, our
results should be regarded as a best-case scenario for
municipal fiber.
4 Caveat: the relatively small number of observations limits
the statistical significance of these regressions.

MUNICIPAL FIBER’S
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE:
A LOOK AT CASH FLOWS

NOTES
These include Marietta, GA (1996-2004); Provo, UT
(2004-2008); Quincy, FL (2004-13); Dunellon, FL (201113); and Bristol, VA (2003-2016).
2 Other sources include FTTH Council (2009) and Montagne
and Chaillou (2010). Of these, two projects spanned
multiple cities (the Electric Power Board of Chattanooga
and the Utah Open Infrastructure Agency (UTOPIA)), and
1

3

2
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eleven fiber projects substantially
improve their performance, they will
soon have to consider whether their
citizens would be better off if they
ceased operations. Of the nine remaining projects, five would require over a
century at current rates to recover the
cost of their projects (Pulaski, TN;
Tullahoma, TN; Chattanooga, TN;
Powell, WY; and Brookings, SD). The
DCF analysis of Chattanooga – the
municipal fiber project most often
held up as a role model – reveals it
would take 412 years to break even
at the performance levels achieved
from 2010 to 2014. Two other projects
would require over 60 years (Fayette-

Our analysis also suggests that
Vernon, CA, recovered its estimated
project costs after only two years of
operation, but the reasons for this
quick turnaround limit Vernon’s usefulness as a model for other projects.
Vernon is a small city outside of Los
Angeles and home to only about
100 residents, but over 1,800 businesses. The municipality is thus almost
entirely comprised of commercial
enterprises. This means that for Vernon, estimating project cost on a perhousehold basis probably substantially
understates its actual costs. Indeed, the
City’s audited balance sheet indicates
that the project cost was $3 million as

ville, TN; and Windom, MN). Such
results are problematic when the
useful life of a fiber network is usually
estimated to be 30 to 40 years.
The data identify two potential
success stories. If Bristol, TN, were to
maintain the results it achieved from
2010 to 2014, its project would break
even after 34 years of operation. That
said, Bristol did not begin offering
fiber until 2012. That means that
the inclusion in the analysis of the
stronger results for 2010 and 2011,
when Bristol was offering only DSL
service, may not be representative of
the likely long-run performance of its
fiber operations.

TABLE 1: RESULTS FROM THE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS
Municipality

Age of Project
Adjusted
Project Cost per
Total
as of 2010
Project Cost
Household
Discounted
		
(2010 dollars)		
Cash Flows,
				
2010-14

Years for
Project to Turn
Positive

Annual Rate of
Revenue
Growth

Full Data Available:
Fayetteville, TN

10

-$14,039,772

$4,237

$1,141,877

61

4.53%

UTOPIA, UT

8

-$224,877,300

$1,547

-$7,188,982

never

16.77%
3.10%

Kutztown, PA

8

-$7,050,207

$3,412

-$1,748,722

never

Windom, MN

6

-$10,963,025

$4,709

$838,936

65

9.86%

Pulaski, TN

5

-$9,602,904

$2,425

$97,948

490

10.30%

Burlington, VT

4

-$36,383,199

$2,139

-$10,605,688

never

0.68%

Lafayette, LA

3

-$118,789,745

$2,215

-$36,086,333

never

35.94%

Tullahoma, TN

3

-$18,264,172

$2,053

$846,549

108

20.13%

Clarksville, TN

3

-$43,253,003

$765

-$7,442,513

never

23.65%

Chattanooga, TN

2

-$170,101,635

$1,099

$2,062,787

412

41.08%

Monticello, MN

2

-$27,767,517

$5,549

-$25,508,327

never

34.86%

Wilson, NC

2

-$30,649,795

$1,417

-$2,900,201

never

10.12%

Salisbury, NC

2

-$31,500,303

$2,224

-$1,702,339

never

103.82%

Project Cost and Cost of Capital Estimated:
Churchill County, NV

6

-$24,893,781

$2,215 (est.)

-$470,833

never

-2.39%

Vernon, CA

5

-$59,390

$2,215 (est.)

$156,602*

2

16.63%

Loma Linda, CA

5

-$22,064,618

$2,215 (est.)

-$2,445,825

never

10.32%

Bristol, TN

5

-$28,692,715

$2,215 (est.)

$4,168,048

34

19.22%

Morristown, TN

4

-$28,779,887

$2,215 (est.)

-$4,281,017

never

8.28%

Brookings, SD

4

-$20,252,,935

$2,215 (est.)

$290,521

349

4.27%

Powell, WY

3

-$6,225,980

$2,215 (est.)

$24,847

1,253

14.88%
103.82%

High

10

-$59,390

$5,549

$4,168,048

1,253

Low

2

-$224,877,300

$765

-$36,086,333

never

-2.39%

Median

4

-$26,299,149

$2,215

-$1,086,586

108

10.32%

2.2

$57,141,294

$1,143

$9,549,916

375

22.06%

Standard Deviation

3
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of 2006, which would imply a payback period of 110 years. In any event,
Vernon’s commercial focus makes its
FTTH build atypical and an inapt
model for cities considering projects
that are primarily residential.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE
FTTH PROJECTS
The data permit us to construct two
different estimates of how any hypothetical project might perform. The
first approach uses the actual returns
achieved on a per-household basis
by the projects we are studying to
estimate how a future project might
perform during the 14-year period for
which we have data (excluding Vernon,
because its commercial focus limits
its usefulness for a per-household
analysis). These data suggest that during its first 14 years, a hypothetical
project would have an aggregate loss
of -$705 per household. Adding this
to the average adjusted project cost per
household of $2,215 yields a total cost
of FTTH operations of -$2,920 per
household over its first 14 years.
The second approach employs
regression analysis on the data to
construct a model that extrapolates the
financial performance of a hypothetical
project beyond the 14 years for which
we have data.4 Depending on the type
of regression employed, the model
estimates that a project would take
from 81 to 318 years to break even. A
separate regression allows us to explore
whether these poor results are the
result of weak revenue from attracting
too few subscribers (measured by revenue/household), inefficient operations
(measured by operating cost/operating
revenue), or from capital expenses that

are too high (measured project cost/
household). Statistically, the specifications including Vernon identify
revenue per household as the statistically significant factor, while some of
the specifications excluding Vernon
indicate that operating efficiency is
the key driver. Together these results
suggest that marketing and operating expenses (opex) play more critical
roles in the success of a municipal fiber
project than capital expenses (capex).
Case studies of seven high-profile
projects provide additional insight into
the challenges that municipal fiber
projects face in generating positive
cash flows. Returning to Chattanooga,
the Electric Power Board (EPB) began
offering broadband service in 2009. By
2014, it was earning more than $1,200
per household in annual revenue. This
compares favorably with the $446
in annual revenue per household
achieved by all of the municipalities in this study. However, its annual
positive cash flow during the five-year
period from 2010 to 2014 of roughly
$400,000 is dwarfed by the $162
million in bond indebtedness EPB
undertook to finance this venture. This
analysis does not even consider the
initial $50 million loan from the EPB’s
electric power operations used to
launch the project or the non-replicable $111.5 million in federal stimulus
funding that EPB received from the
Department of Energy. The addition
of stimulus funding to the analysis
increases the break-even period from
412 to 683 years. It bears noting that
the financial performance of some of
these projects may improve, and the
high-level analysis may overlook key
details that can help explain the results
in particular cases. That said, the over4

all analysis provides a useful snapshot
of the challenges that municipal fiber
projects face.

LESSONS FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS
Debates over municipal fiber have
been long on rhetoric and short on
empirical analysis. This Issue Brief
attempts to fill that void and provide
cities weighing whether or not to
initiate a municipal fiber project with
concrete data on which to base their
decisions. The overall dataset provides
considerable reason for caution—not
just on the part of city leaders, but
also lawmakers and regulators at the
state and federal levels who have
viewed municipal broadband as an
economically viable tool for closing
the digital divide. More than half of
the projects in this study are cash-flow
negative, and 90 percent are unable
to generate sufficient cash during the
period studied to recover their project
costs within the life expectancy of
these assets, which is between 30 and
40 years.
A closer examination of specific
projects reveals that the risks and
consequences are quite real. Many cities managing these projects have faced
defaults, reductions in bond ratings,
and ongoing liability that prevented
them from undertaking other initiatives and exacted a toll on city leaders
in terms of personal turmoil and distraction from other matters important
to citizens. City leaders should carefully assess all of these costs and risks
in light of their own situations before
permitting a municipal fiber program
to go forward.
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